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Abstract—Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) via satellite offers
up the possibility of unconditionally secure communications on
a global scale. Increasing the secret key rate in such systems, via
photonic engineering at the source, is a topic of much ongoing
research. In this work we investigate the use of photon-added
states and photon-subtracted states, derived from two mode
squeezed vacuum states, as examples of such photonic engineer-
ing. Specifically, we determine which engineered-photonic state
provides for better QKD performance when implemented over
channels connecting terrestrial receivers with Low-Earth-Orbit
satellites. We quantify the impact the number of photons that
are added or subtracted has, and highlight the role played by
the adopted model for atmospheric turbulence and loss on the
predicted key rates. Our results are presented in terms of the
complexity of deployment used, with the simplest deployments
ignoring any estimate of the channel, and the more sophisticated
deployments involving a feedback loop that is used to optimize
the key rate for each channel estimation. The optimal quantum
state is identified for each deployment scenario investigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) via satellite offers a
paradigm shift for the deployment of large-scale quantum
information protocols, e.g. [1]–[3]. Light propagation through
the atmosphere to and from Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) satellites
can overcome the ∼ 100km distance limitation that currently
constrains terrestrial quantum communication links. In the
past few years breakthroughs have been made in the actual
deployment of quantum communications via satellites [4]–[7]
- breakthroughs that use Discrete-Variable (DV) technology
(single-photon states and entangled photon pairs).
Continuous-Variable (CV) quantum states provide an en-
tirely different way to transmit quantum information. Com-
pared to DV technology, CV technology has the advantage
of ‘off-the-shelf’ technology based on efficient homodyne
detectors [8], [9] (or polarization detectors [10]), and the fact
that QKD protocols using CV detectors potentially provides
for a more realistic route to higher secret key rates [11].
Currently, no experimental implementation of space-based
CV-QKD has been carried out. But this is expected to change
in the near future [12]. Being a special category of CV
quantum states, Gaussian CV states have been well-researched
both theoretically and experimentally [13]. However, CV-QKD
protocols with non-Gaussian states, such as those produced via
photon subtraction, have also garnered great interest. This is so
partially because such states potentially allow for a higher level
of entanglement at a given energy [14]–[16], and that they can
be a pivotal resource for quantum information tasks such as
quantum error correction [17]. It is natural to hypothesize that
non-Gaussian states can also boost the secret key rate of CV-
QKD protocols, e.g., [18]–[21].
In our previous work we have investigated the performance
of a CV-QKD protocol using a single-photon-subtracted state
over an Earth-satellite channel, determining whether trans-
mitter or receiver photonic subtraction is preferred [22]. In
this work we significantly extend our previous study with the
following new contributions. (i) Multiple-photon-subtracted
states are investigated. These highly non-Gaussian states are
created by performing multiple-photon subtraction to a Two
Mode Squeezed Vacuum (TMSV) state at the transmitter. (ii)
Multiple-photon-added states are also investigated, again via
photonic engineering on the TMSV state at the transmitter. (iii)
Optimization of the input TMSV states (dynamic adjustments
to squeezing) based on the anticipated loss in the channel is
investigated. (iv) An updated model for the probability density
function (PDF) of the transmissivity of the fading channel is
adopted [23], which includes other important physical effects
beyond the beam-wandering effect used in our previous work.
Looking at all these effects collectively will allow us to
determine whether the use of photonic engineering at the
transmitter truly allows for better pathways to improved higher
secret key rates over Earth-satellite channels. No previous
study has looked at all the above effects collectively in the
manner we do here.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows.
In Section II, the model of the Earth-satellite quantum channel
between terrestrial stations and LEO satellites is described. In
Section III, our CV-QKD protocols with non-Gaussian states
are described, and in Section IV of our simulation results are
presented.
II. EARTH-SATELLITE CHANNELS
We consider the model of a direct vertical link between
the satellite and a terrestrial station. Our quantum information
carrier is a pulsed optical beam. For optical signals in the
Earth-satellite channel, the dominant loss mechanisms will
be beam-wandering, beam-broadening, and beam-deformation,
all randomly caused by turbulence in the Earth’s atmosphere
(Fig. 1) [24]. The beam-broadening is also a consequence of
diffraction. These effects are well-described by a recent model
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the beam-profile over the Earth-satellite channel, where
beam-wandering causes the deviation of the beam-centroid, beam-broadening
expands the beam-profile, and beam-deformation alters the shape of the beam-
profile. Here the orange circle represents the beam-profile at the transmitter,
the dotted circle with radius r0 illustrates the detector aperture, and the orange
eclipse represents the beam-profile at the receiver. Here we use different scales
for the two sides for better illustration.
proposed by [23], where the channel transmissivity (aperture
transmittance) TE reads
TE = T0 exp
−
[ √
x2 + y2/r0
R( 2Weff (φ−φ0) )
]λ(2/Weff (φ−φ0)) , (1)
where (x, y) is the 2-D position of the beam-centroid, r0 is
the aperture radius of the detector, φ is the beam rotation
angle, φ0 = tan−1 yx , Weff is the effective spot-radius, and
T0 is the maximal attainable transmissivity achieved when
(x, y) = (0, 0) (i.e. no beam-centroid deviation). These latter
two parameters can be expressed
W 2eff(φ) = 4r
2
0
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2
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1 )[1+2 cos
2(φ)]
× e(r20/W 22 )[1+2 sin2(φ)]
)}−1
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(
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− 1
W 22
])
e−r
2
0(1/W
2
1 +1/W
2
2 )
−2
[
1− e−(r20/2)[1/W1−1/W2]2
]
× exp
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(W1+W2)
2
|W21−W22 |
R
(
1
W1
− 1W2
)
]λ( 1W1− 1W2 ) ,
(3)
where W1 and W2 are elliptical semi-axis lengths, and R(W )
and λ(W ) are scaling and shaping functions given by,
R(W ) =
[
ln
(
2
1− exp [− 12r20W 2]
1− exp [−r20W 2] I0(r20W 2)
)]− 1
λ(W )
, (4)
λ(W ) = 2r20W
2 exp [−r20W 2]I1(r20W 2)
1−exp[−r20W 2]I0(r20W 2)
×
[
ln
(
2
1−exp[− 12 r20W 2]
1−exp[−r20W 2]I0(r20W 2)
)]−1
.
(5)
HereW(·) is the Lambert W function, and Ii(·) is the modified
Bessel function of i-th order.
The channel transmissivity TE is a function of five real
random variables {x, y, θ1, θ2, φ}, where θi = ln W
2
i
W 20
with
W0 being the beam-waist. It is assumed that x and y are
i.i.d. and they both follow a zero-mean Gaussian distribution.
Parameters θ1 and θ2 are taken to follow a joint-Gaussian
distribution. Assuming the turbulence is isotropic, the rotation
angle φ is uniformly distributed.
Building upon [23], [25] showed for Earth-satellite links the
mean and variance of {x, y, θ1, θ2} can be written
〈
θ1/2
〉
= ln
 (1 + 2.96σ2IΩ5/6)2
Ω2
√(
1 + 2.96σ2IΩ
5/6
)2
+ 1.2σ2IΩ
5/6
,
〈
∆θ1/2
2
〉
= ln
[
1 + 1.2σ2IΩ
5/6/
(
1 + 2.96σ2IΩ
5/6
)2]
,
〈∆θ1∆θ2〉 = ln
[
1− 0.8σ2IΩ5/6/
(
1 + 2.96σ2IΩ
5/6
)2]
,〈
∆x2
〉
=
〈
∆y2
〉
= 0.33W 20 σ
2
IΩ
−7/6,
(6)
where Ω = kW
2
0
2L , with k being the optical wavenumber, L the
propagation distance, and σ2I the scintillation index [26]. The
scintillation index can be written
σ2I = exp
 0.49σ2R(
1 + ζσ
12/5
R
)7/6 + 0.51σ2R(
1 + 0.69σ
12/5
R
)5/6
− 1,
(7)
where the parameter ζ is set as 0.56 and 1.11 for uplink and
downlink channels, respectively. In the above equation, σ2R is
the Rytov variance [24],
σ2R = 2.25k
7/6
∫ h0+L
h0
C2n (h) (h− h0)5/6 dh (8)
with h0 the altitude above sea level of the ground station
and C2n(h) the refraction index structure constant. Using the
Hufnagel-Valley model, C2n(h) is described by [27]
C2n(h) =0.00594(v/27)
2(h× 10−5)10e− h1000
+ 2.7× 10−16e− h1500 +Ae− h100 , (9)
where v is the r.m.s. wind speed in m/s and A is the nominal
value of C2n(0) at sea level in m
−2/3.
Note, in the downlink satellite channel the beam-wandering
effect is minor. This is largely because the beam-width on
entry into the atmosphere from space is generally broader than
the scale of the turbulent eddies [24]. As such, with well-
engineered designs the mean channel attenuation in the uplink
and that in the downlink, can be anticipated to be 20-30dB and
5-10dB, respectively.
III. CV-QKD WITH PSS AND PAS
A. Photon Addition and Photon Subtraction
Before detailing our QKD protocol, we first discuss the
experimental production of a multiple-Photon-Subtracted State
(PSS) and a multiple-Photon-Added State (PAS).
A TMSV1 state with mode A and mode B0 can be repre-
sented in the number (Fock) basis as
|ψ〉TMSV =
∞∑
n=0
an|n, n〉AB0 (10)
1A TMSV state can be created by applying the two-mode squeezing
operator S(r) to two vacuum states, where r is the squeezing factor that
satisfies sinh2 r = α2. The squeezing degree (in dB) of a TMSV state is
given by r[dB] = −10 log10 [exp(−2r)].
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with
an =
√
α2n
(1 + α2)
n+1 , (11)
where α2 is the mean photon number of the TMSV state. A
TMSV state has the covariance matrix (CM)
γTMSV =
[ (
1 + 2α2
)
I 2
√
α4 + α2σz
2
√
α4 + α2σz
(
1 + 2α2
)
I
]
, (12)
where I = diag(1, 1), σz = diag(1,−1), and we assume ~ =
2 so that the vacuum noise is 1.
A PSS can be generated by inserting a mode, say B0, of
state |ψ〉TMSV and an ancillary mode C0 = |0〉 into the two
inputs of a beam splitter (see red box of Fig. 2a). Denoting the
transmissivity of the beam splitter as TS , and its two output
modes as B and C, a PSS with N photons subtracted is
produced when C = |N〉. The PSS has the form
|ψ〉PSS =
(−1)N√
PS,N
∞∑
n=N
anr
TS
n,N |n, n−N〉AB , (13)
where
rTn,N =
√(
n
N
)
(
√
T )n−N
√
1− TN . (14)
The probability for this outcome can be determined as
PS,N =
[
α2 (1− TS)
]N
(1 + α2 − α2TS)N+1
. (15)
Such states possess a CM given by
γS =
[
xI zσz
zσz yI
]
=
 (1 + 2N+T1−T ) I (2√T N+11−T )σz(
2
√
T N+11−T
)
σz
(
1 + 2 (N+1)T1−T
)
I
 , (16)
where T = α
2
1+α2TS .
A PAS can be produced by replacing the aforementioned
state C0 with |N〉 (see red box of Fig. 2b). It has the form
|ψ〉PAS =
(−1)N√
PA,N
∞∑
n=0
anr
TS
n+N,N |n, n+N〉AB
=
(−1)N√(1 + α−2)N√
PA,N
∞∑
n=N
anr
TS
n,N |n−N,n〉AB ,
(17)
and is created when C = |0〉. This outcome has a probability
PA,N =
[
(α2 + 1) (1− TS)
]N
(1 + α2 − α2TS)N+1
. (18)
A PAS possesses a CM similar to γS except for the values
of the variances of the two modes being swapped., i.e.,
γA =
[
yI zσz
zσz xI
]
. (19)
For simplicity we assume that both |N〉 and |0〉 are pro-
duced with unit efficiency. In this case, the overall successful
probability for the photon subtraction and that for the photon
addition are PS,N and PA,N , respectively.
B. CV-QKD Protocol and Secret Key Rate
In this work we consider an entanglement-based CV-QKD
protocol (homodyne at Alice and Bob) with reverse reconcilia-
tion. We study only non-Gaussian operations at the transmitter
side.2 We consider two schemes, namely the T-PS and the T-
PA schemes. As illustrated in Fig. 2, in both schemes Alice
first prepares her TMSV state ρAB0 . She then produces the
PSS (in T-PS scheme) or the PAS (in T-PA scheme) by
performing corresponding non-Gaussian operation to ρAB0 .
The resultant state of the non-Gaussian operation is labeled
with ρAB1 . Alice will send mode B1 to Bob.
Note that, comparing Eq. (15) and (18) we find that PA,N
is larger than PS,N by a factor of
(
1 + α−2
)N
. We also
note from Eq. (13) and Eq. (17) that for a TMSV state,
subtracting photons from one mode yields the same state as
adding photons to another mode (up to a normalization factor)
[14]. In fact, this latter method of ‘photon subtraction’ retains
the higher probability given by Eq. (18). Considering this
advantage we assume that in our T-PS scheme the PSS is
created by adding photons to mode A of the TMSV state ρAB0 .
The resultant PSS has the CM, γS , given by Eq. (16). Under
the assumptions made here, the probabilities for T-PS and its
corresponding T-PA are the same. The reader should scale the
calculations to follow, if they wish to account for some non-
equal probabilities (e.g. a non-unity efficiency of producing
the state |N〉).
A frequently used attack is the entanglement cloning attack
[28]–[30]. Under this attack it is usually assumed that Eve can
obtain a purification of Alice and Bob’s system, so that she can
attain the maximal quantum information. However, for non-
Gaussian states the premise of this attack is not, in general,
compatible with the Gaussification assumption under which
Eve replaces the non-Gaussian state ρ with a Gaussian state
ρG that has the same CM, since one can show that ρG is not a
pure state (i.e. the entanglement cloning attack is not optimal
for non-pure state). Therefore, we do not consider here any
physical implementation of Eve’s attack: we simply assume
that Eve Gaussifies the state ρAB1 and purifies the Gaussified
state ρAB2 with her ancillary system ρE .
Let us denote the channel transmissivity as TE and the input
excess noise as ε. We assume Eve hides herself by mimicking
the anticipated noise conditions for a given realization of TE ,
based on Eqs. (1) to (9). Eve will interact her ancillary mode
with every incoming mode, she will then store her mode in
a quantum memory, performing a joint measurement on her
system after the reverse reconciliation process.
After receiving a mode, Bob will perform an imperfect
homodyne detection with a detection thermal noise ν and
an efficiency ηd. This imperfection can be modeled by first
interacting mode B2 with one mode of a TMSV state (G0−H)
with variance ν at a beam splitter with transmissivity ηd [31].
Denoting G and B3 as the output modes of such a beam
splitter, mode B3 will then be injected into a perfect homodyne
2We focus on the transmitter side because we consider the use of photonic
engineering coupled to future quantum memory at the transmitter will ulti-
mately lead to better real-time outcomes relative to photonic-engineering only
at the receiver side. For example, non-Gaussian states stored in the transmitter
quantum memory can be used ‘on-demand’ in future QKD set-ups.
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Fig. 2. (a) The T-PS scheme. (b) The T-PA scheme. (QM: quantum memory.
HOM: homodyne detector. PD: photon detector.)
detector. Under this scenario we assume Eve does not have
access to Bob’s detection device.
In the asymptotic limit for key size, the secret key rate for
our non-Gaussian state protocol is lower bounded by [32]
K ≥ PN [ηrI(A:B3)− χ(E :B3)] , (20)
where PN = PA,N is the successful probability for adding N
photons to the TMSV state, ηr is the reverse reconciliation ef-
ficiency, I(A :B3) is the classical mutual information between
Alice and Bob, and χ(E :B3) is the Holevo bound for Eve’s
information (which is the attainable quantum information
given Bob’s measurements).
Alice and Bob’s mutual information is calculated by
I(A:B3) = H(A)−H(A|B3)
=
1
2
log2
VA
VA|B3
, (21)
where VA is the variance of Alice’s mode, and VA|B3 is the
variance of Alice’s mode conditioned on Bob’s homodyne
measurement. For the Holevo bound, since Eve holds a pu-
rification of ρAB2 , and after Bob’s measurement the system
ρAEGH is pure, we have
χ(E :B3) = S(E)− S(E|B3)
= S(AB2)− S(AGH|B3)
=
2∑
i=1
g (λi)−
5∑
j=3
g (λj) , (22)
where g(x) = x+12 log2
x+1
2 − x−12 log2 x−12 , and λi’s and
λj’s are the symplectic eigenvalues of the CM characterizing
the state ρAB2 , and the CM characterizing the state ρAGH
conditioned on Bob’s measurement, respectively.
C. Evolution of the Covariance Matrix
For calculation of the secret key rate we need to calculate
I(A :B3) and χ(E :B3), which are determined by the CMs
of the states ρAB2 and ρAGHB3 . Noticing the evolution of
the CM follows the same procedure for both T-PS and T-PA
schemes, we use the T-PS scheme as an example to derive the
CMs.
The PSS ρAB1 prepared by Alice has the CM γAB1 given
by Eq. (16). After the channel, the state ρAB1 evolves to ρAB2 ,
the CM of which is
γAB2 =
[
xI
√
TEzσz√
TEzσz [TE(y + ε) + (1− TE)] I
]
=
[
xI z′σz
z′σz y′I
]
. (23)
The symplectic eigenvalues of the above CM are
λ1,2 =
1
2
[√
(x+ y′)2 − 4z′2 ± (y′ − x)
]
. (24)
The CM of the state before Bob’s detection (ρAGHB3 ) is
γAGHB3 =
[
γAGH σAGHB3
σTAGHB3 γB3
]
, (25)
where
γAGH =
 xI CAGσz 0CAGσz [ηdν + (1− ηd)y′] I CGHσz
0 CGHσz νI
 ,
(26)
σAGHB3 =
 √ηdz′σz√(1− ηd)ηd(ν − y′)σz√
(1− ηd)(ν2 − 1)σz
 , (27)
CAG = −
√
1− ηdz′, CGH =
√
ηd(ν2 − 1), and
γB3 = [ηdy
′ + (1− ηd)ν] I = y′′I. (28)
Suppose Bob homodynes the x-quadrature of mode B3, the
CM of the state ρAGH conditioned on such measurement is
γAGH|B3 = γAGH −
1
y′′
σAGHB3Xσ
T
AGHB3 , (29)
where X = diag(1, 0). Let λ3, λ4, and λ5 be the symplectic
eigenvalues of the CM γAGH|B3 ; then the Holevo bound for
Eve’s information χ(E :B3) can be calculated by putting the
symplectic eigenvalues (λ1 to λ5) into Eq. (22).
The mutual information between Alice and Bob in Eq. (21)
can now be expressed as
I(A:B3) =
1
2
log2
1
1− ηdTEz2ηdTExy+cx
, (30)
where c = ηd [(1− TE) + TEε] + (1− ηd)ν.
We are ready to use Eq. (20) to calculate the secret key rate
for a given channel transmissivity TE . Before doing this let us
note that if we denote fTE to be the PDF of TE , the average
secret key rate over the Earth-satellite channel is
K =
∫ T0
0
fTE (T )K(T ) dT , (31)
where K(T ) is the secret key rate for a transmissivity T .
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Fig. 3. Secret key rate over the fixed-attenuation channel with α2 = 20
(solid) and α2 = 5 (dashed). Here we set TS = 0.7 and N = 1. Note
that for the non-TMSV schemes, the α2 refers to the TMSV state that was
initially utilized in the scheme.
Fig. 4. Optimal secret key rate over the fixed-attenuation channel. The RB is
given by C = − log2(1 − TE). The blue and red dashed curves represents
the scenario where a quantum memory device is at the transmitter, so that
Alice can prepare her PSS or PAS in advance. In such a scenario we can
assume the probability of creating a PSS or a PAS is one (the curves labeled
‘Norm’ indicate such a scenario).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The noise parameters we adopt are ε = 0.1 and ν = 1.1
(both in vacuum noise units), which are roughly 10% higher
than the experimental data of [18]. We also adopt the efficiency
parameters from [20], namely, ηr = 0.95 and ηd = 0.68.
Using the initial TMSV state (i.e. no photonic engineering)
as a reference, we first compare the performance of different
schemes over fixed-attenuation channels. We consider two dif-
ferent entanglement levels. We set the mean photon number of
the TMSV state, α2, equal to 20 and 5, where the former value
represents a higher entanglement level. The transmissivity of
the beam splitter for photon addition is set as TS = 0.7.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, at higher entanglement (solid curves)
the T-PS scheme has a higher key rate at high attenuation.
At lower entanglement (dashed curves), however, the TMSV
scheme has the highest secret key rate over the entire attenu-
ation range. Comparing just the curves of the T-PS scheme at
the different entanglement levels we can see that the lower
entanglement curve has a higher secret key rate when the
Fig. 5. Optimal α2 (top) and TS (bottom) vs. channel attenuation.
channel attenuation channel is less than 26dB. This means, that
in practice the value of α2 for a given channel transmissivity
TE can be set so as to optimize the secret key rate. A similar
discussion applies to the T-PA scheme. Such optimization can
be implemented through some channel co-measurement (e.g a
coherent beam sent simultaneously with the quantum signal)
and a closed-feedback loop. Note, that we also can optimize
the key rate via setting the value of TS .
If indeed we optimize α2 and TS (simultaneously) along
these lines for each scheme the results are different. Fig. 4
shows the secret key rate with optimized parameters for the
fixed-attenuation channel, and Fig. 5 illustrates the correspond-
ing optimal parameters as a function of attenuation. Note,
in Fig. 4, and subsequent figures, the digits ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’
near each curve illustrate the number of photons (N ) being
subtracted (or added), and RB represents the ‘Repeaterless
Bound’, which is the upper bound for the channel capacity of a
pure-loss channel without a repeater [33], [34] 3. In Fig. 4 the
TMSV scheme has the highest key rate across all attenuation
values. Even in the situation where there is a quantum memory
set-up at the transmitter, the T-PS and T-PA schemes still have
lower key rates than the TMSV scheme. We also note that the
for a given quantum memory scenario and a given N , the T-PA
scheme always has worse performance than the T-PS scheme.
This is mainly because that Eve can obtain more information
from the PAS than the PSS.
We now move onto the investigation of the CV-QKD
protocols over Earth-satellite fading channels. For the fading
channel we adopt the parameters from the experiment in [23],
namely W0 = 20mm, r0 = 40mm, and h0 = 0m; and set
the wavelength of the beam to 809nm. By varying σ2I and
L we study the performance of our schemes in various loss
conditions. These conditions are characterized with the mean
channel transmissivity
TE =
∫ T0
0
fTE (T )T dT. (32)
Since there are no closed-form solutions for the PDF of the
channel transmissivity TE , we use a Monte Carlo algorithm
3See [35] for further discussion on the history of this bound.
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Fig. 6. Average secret key rate over the Earth-satellite channel with only
the beam-wandering effect considered. Here the RB is averaged and given by
C = − ∫ T00 fTE (T ) log2(1− T ) dT . (α2 = 20 and TS = 0.7)
Fig. 7. Average secret key rate over the Earth-satellite channel with
all the three effects considered. Here the RB is approximated by C =
−∑Nsn=0 log2(1− Tn)/Ns. (α2 = 20 and TS = 0.7)
to simulate the channel. In this case, Eq. (31) and Eq. (32) are
approximated by
K ≈ 1
Ns
Ns∑
n
K(Tn), (33)
and
TE ≈ 1
Ns
Ns∑
n
Tn , (34)
respectively, where Tn is channel transmissivity sample gen-
erated by the Monte Carlo algorithm, and Ns is the number of
transmissivity samples. We set Ns = 220 for each simulation
run.
We first study the impact of the updated channel model. To
do so, we consider the simplest case of no channel estimation
or optimization. Fig. 6 illustrates the scenario where we only
consider the beam-wandering effect over the Earth-satellite
channel (in this scenario the closed-form solution to fTE is
tractable). Here we assume r0W1 =
r0
W2
= 2. One can see the
average secret key rate of all the schemes drops gently with
increasing mean attenuation. When we assume the atmospheric
turbulence does not change the size or shape of the beam-
profile, the maximal attainable transmissivity T0 would be
Fig. 8. Average key rate optimized for mean channel transmissivity. We
consider the Earth-satellite channel with all the three effects. Here the RB is
the same as Fig. 7.
Fig. 9. Average secret key rate optimized for each measured channel trans-
missivity (dashed-dot curves), and optimized for mean channel transmissivity
(solid curves). Here we consider all the three channel effects. For conciseness
only the scenario that N = 1 is illustrated.
fixed for a given propagation distance. Consequently, it is
always possible to sample (albeit with low probability) a large
transmissivity regardless of the mean attenuation value.
Taking the beam-broadening and the beam-deformation ef-
fects caused by the turbulence into consideration, in Fig. 7 the
average key rate is plotted against mean channel attenuation.
These two effects bring drastic changes. Assuming the size
and shape of the beam-profile are distorted by the turbulence,
a random mismatch would occur between the beam-profile
and the detector aperture. In this case, the maximal attainable
transmissivity T0 itself will follow a certain probability distri-
bution, making the probability of having a large transmissivity
significantly smaller than the previous scenario.
For parameter optimization we consider two schemes. In
our first scheme we estimate the mean transmissivity TE of
the channel, and then optimize the parameters α2 and TS
based on the anticipated TE . The results are illustrated in
Fig. 8. Here for a given TE we directly use the results from
Fig. 5 for the optimal parameter settings. Comparing Fig. 4 and
Fig. 8 one can see that all the schemes have better attenuation
tolerance over the Earth-satellite channel. This is due to the
fading property of the Earth-satellite channel. Simply put, the
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probability of having a transmissivity larger than its mean
value is always non-zero.
We next consider a more complex system, where we
measure the channel transmissivity within each coherence
time window and optimize the parameters based on this
measurement. In this case, the parameters are optimized for
each Tn. The two optimization schemes are compared in
Fig. 9. The measurement-based scheme (for each Tn) offers
only a slight improvement to the secret key rate. Considering
the complexity of such a scheme, the mean-value based
optimization scheme would be a good practical choice for
physical implementation.
An important result is that for satellite communications the
single-PSS has the highest average key rate amongst the non-
Gaussian states we have considered, making it our preferred
candidate for non-Gaussian state based CV-QKD protocols.
Focusing on the single-PSS, over the downlink channel (5-
10dB attenuation) a mean photon number α2 ∼ 10 of the
initial TMSV state will suffice to achieve a key rate of 10−2
bits/pulse. Such a mean photon number is equivalent to a 16dB
squeezed TMSV state, which is experimentally achievable at
the moment. Over the uplink channel (20-30dB attenuation)
the optimal α2 is between 5 to 10. The corresponding optimal
secret key rate is around 10−4 bits/pulse. One should also
notice that for non-Gaussian states we employed the lower
bound to evaluate their performance, so the actual secret key
rate will likely be higher.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied the use of PSSs and PASs in the context of
CV-QKD - investigating the lower-bounds on optimal secret
key rates delivered by such states when the photonic engi-
neering is performed at the transmitter. Our results highlight
the role played by deployment scenarios in determining the
optimal photonic engineered state, as well as highlighting the
role atmospheric turbulence has on the predicted key rates.
Beyond the impact on the secure key rates, the results shown
here could also be important for future space missions in which
non-Gaussian states will be used for other applications.
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